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Abstract: We examine vertical backward integration in a reduced-
form model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There
may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and oth-
ers remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Ef-
ficient firms are more likely to integrate vertically. As a result, in-
tegrated firms also tend to have a large market share. The driving
force behind these findings are demand/mark-up complementarities
in the product market. We also identify countervailing forces result-
ing from strong vertical foreclosure, upstream sales and endogenous
acquisition costs.
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1 Introduction
In many industries, vertically integrated and separated firms coexist. And,
many times, it is the larger firms that are integrated. In the U.S. petroleum
refining industry, for instance, many large refiners are integrated backward
into the exploration and extraction of crude oil or forward into market-
ing and distribution. Yet, other firms choose a non-integrated structure,
separated from both oil production and retailing. Interestingly, these non-
integrated firms tend to be smaller, doing less refining.1
Another well-known example for such asymmetric vertical integration
is the package holidays industry, where tour operators assemble holiday
packages by contracting with suppliers of transport and accommodation
services. In its investigation of the U.K. market, the European Commis-
sion (1999a, no. 73) noted that the “polarization of the market into large
integrated companies and smaller non-integrated companies is a widely rec-
ognized trend in the industry.”2
Asymmetric vertical structures are also documented, e.g., for the beer
industry in the U.K. (Slade 1998a), the retail gasoline market in Vancouver
(Slade 1998b), the U.S. cable television industry (Waterman and Weiss
1996, Chipty 2001), and the Mexican footwear industry (Woodruff 2002).
The integration patterns observed in these industries are broadly consistent
with the notion that large firms tend to be integrated, whereas smaller firms
are often non-integrated.
In this paper, we examine how asymmetric vertical structures come
about and why integrated firms tend to be large in many industries. How-
ever, we also explore countervailing forces, which might explain why the
vertical structure is not always asymmetric and why, even for asymmet-
ric structure, there are also cases where the small firms are integrated.
We adopt a reduced-form approach towards analyzing vertical-integration
decisions in successive oligopolies, avoiding the notorious difficulties with
interpreting intricate closed-form solutions of specific models. We focus
on the case of two downstream firms who may differ with respect to the
efficiency at which they transform an intermediate input into a final good.
These firms simultaneously decide about taking over one of at least two up-
stream firms at fixed acquisition cost, thereby getting access to the input
good at marginal cost. Firms that decide to remain separated continue to
buy the input from the upstream market at the relevant input price. Our
line of argument features four key ingredients.
(1) Efficiency and Foreclosure Effects. We note that previous liter-
1See Bindemann (1999) and Aydemir and Buehler (2002) for details on vertical inte-
gration in the oil industry.
2Also, Damien Neven was quoted as saying that there are essentially two ways of
doing business in this industry: Either “stay small and buy inputs or produce large
volumes and integrate vertically.” (European Commission 1999a, no. 73)
ature has given conditions under which vertical integration reduces the in-
tegrating firm’s marginal costs (efficiency effect) and raises rivals’ marginal
costs (foreclosure effect). The efficiency effect can result from pure techno-
logical economies of scope or the elimination of a mark-up from an imper-
fectly competitive upstream market. The foreclosure effect stems from the
supply reduction on the upstream market associated with the elimination
of an independent upstream supplier.3
(2) Positive Own and Adverse Cross Effects. We argue that when
vertical integration has both an efficiency effect and a foreclosure effect, it
is likely to increase the integrating firm’s downstream equilibrium output
and mark-up (positive own effect), and reduce the rival’s output and mark-
up (adverse cross effect). The positive own effect results because lower own
costs and higher competitor costs both tend to increase own output and
mark-up in standard oligopoly models. The adverse cross effect emerges
because both the increased efficiency of the integrating firm and the reduced
efficiency of the rival tend to reduce the rival’s output and mark-up.
Thus motivated, we view the existence of a combined positive own effect
and adverse cross effect as the essential property of vertical integration. In
doing so, we acknowledge that, in the real world as well as in theoretical
models, neither effect must necessarily arise.4 However, we shall show in
Section 6 that both properties hold in many models of successive oligopolies.
(3) Integration Incentives. We show that–together with some ad-
ditional properties–the simultaneous existence of a positive own effect and
an adverse cross effect implies the following statements:
(a) At least when firms are symmetric initially, integration decisions are
strategic substitutes, i.e. a firm’s returns to integration are (weakly)
lower when its rival is integrated rather than separated;
(b) When a firm has higher transformation efficiency than its rival, that
firm’s net gain from integration is higher.
To explain these statements, we relate back to step (2). Consider state-
ment (a): If integration affects a firm’s own mark-up positively and the
competitor’s output negatively, then the mark-up increase resulting from
integration is more valuable if the competitor is separated, as it applies to
a greater output. That is, there is a demand/mark-up complementarity
in the product market supporting the strategic substitutes property of in-
tegration decisions. The demand/mark-up complementarity also supports
3Since vertical integration will often reduce demand on the wholesale market as well,
it does not necessarily increase the upstream price. As a result, the foreclosure effect is
a less robust feature of standard successive-oligopoly models than the efficiency effect.
4For instance, in-house production may be more costly when specialized suppliers are
more efficient at providing the input (as suggested by Stigler 1951), and the own effect
might therefore be negative. More details are discussed in Section 4.3.3.
statement (b): Low-cost firms have high demand and mark-up and thus
benefit more from an increase of demand and mark-up brought about by
vertical integration.
(4) Characterizing Equilibria. We use standard game-theoretic
techniques to show that (a) and (b) together imply our following main
results:
(i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where only one of the firms in-
tegrates, even if firms are perfectly symmetric initially.
(ii) Low-cost firms are more likely to integrate than high-cost firms. As
low costs coincide with high market shares in standard oligopoly mod-
els, our analysis suggests that large firms are more likely to integrate.
Result (i) is in line with earlier studies examining asymmetric vertical
market structures in more specific settings.5 However, we believe that
our reduced-form approach exposes the basic underlying economic forces
that drive the result more clearly. Our analysis indicates that asymmetric
vertical market structures may be more plausible than previous literature
suggests: In particular, they may occur for various types of product-market
competition, for different functional forms of demand, and when there are
many upstream suppliers.6
To our knowledge, result (ii) has not been addressed in the previous
theoretical literature, which has largely ignored the effects of efficiency
differences on the incentives to integrate.7,8 It fits nicely, however, with the
impression that firm size and vertical integration are correlated (see, e.g.,
Adelman 1955, and Chandler 1977).
Even though we adopt a fairly general reduced-form approach, results
(i) and (ii) should not be expected to hold universally. At least the un-
derlying sufficient conditions (a) and (b) might be violated.9 For instance,
the strategic substitutes property may break down when vertical integra-
tion generates a strong foreclosure effect, that is, a substantial increase of
5These papers include Ordover et al. (1990), Abiru et al. (1998), Elberfeld (2002),
and Jansen (2003); see Section 6 for details.
6Though our paper is general in these respects, it is not a strict generalization of
all papers addressing endogenous vertical integration. For instance, in Ordover et al.
(1990), a firm that has not integrated obtains a second chance to do so after input prices
are determined.
7However, in Dufeu (2004) some firms are more efficient at producing upstream goods,
whereas others are more efficient at producing downstream goods.
8Clearly, other reasons might be put forward to explain why large firms are more
likely to integrate. For instance, small firms might simply face more severe financing
constraints than large firms and thus have difficulties acquiring upstream firms.
9Of course, as conditions (a) and (b) are sufficient but not necessary for (i) and (ii)
to hold, it is still possible that our results go through for non-global violations of (a)
and (b).
upstream prices. In this case, the potential cost reduction from own in-
tegration might be higher when the competitor is integrated rather than
separated, so that firms have an incentive to follow suit to escape foreclo-
sure.
Our paper is potentially relevant for policy analysis. For instance, result
(i) relates to the familiar Chicago school argument that strategic vertical in-
tegration cannot generate competitive harm, because non-integrated firms
can always counter integration by vertically integrating themselves so as to
assure input supply at competitive prices (“bandwagoning”, see e.g. Bork
1978). Our result indicates that bandwagoning may be unprofitable even
when the conditions are favorable, i.e., when firms are symmetric initially
and face the same costs of acquiring an upstream firm. Result (ii), in turn,
cautions against the notion that antitrust authorities should frown on asym-
metric market structures: If low-cost firms are more likely to integrate than
high-cost firms, asymmetric vertical integration tends to improve the indus-
try’s productive efficiency by shifting output from less efficient separated
firms to more efficient integrated firms.10
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the analytical framework, taking ingredients (1) and (2) above for granted.
Section 3 provides a linear Cournot example fitting into our framework.
Section 4 analyzes vertical-integration decisions in reduced form and pro-
vides our main results, which amount to ingredients (3) and (4) above. Sec-
tion 5 outlines generalizations of our analysis to (i) more than two firms, (ii)
upstream sales of integrated firms, and (iii) endogenous acquisition costs.
Section 6 discusses the relation to the literature. In particular, this sec-
tion supplies ingredient (1). Section 7 concludes. The exact derivation of
ingredient (2) is left to an Appendix.
2 Analytical Framework
Consider an industry where, initially, there are two separated downstream
firms i = 1, 2 and at least two separated upstream firms. The upstream
firms produce an intermediate good that the downstream firms transform
into a final product. Importantly, downstream firms may differ with respect
to their efficiency in this activity.
In stage 1, the downstream firms decide whether to integrate backwards
by acquiring one of the upstream firms (Vi = 1) or not (Vi = 0). In stage 2,
the remaining separated upstream firms set wholesale prices or quantities
for the downstream market, unless both downstream firms are integrated.
In stage 3, downstream firms compete in the product market.
10Riordan (1998) discusses a similar effect in a model where the dominant firm has
an exogenous cost advantage relative to a competitive fringe.
As will become clear below, stages 1 and 2 determine the marginal
downstream costs ci, i = 1, 2. For given values of ci, downstream product-
market competition in stage 3 is given in reduced form as follows.
Assumption 1 For every c ≡ (c1, c2), there exists a unique product-market
equilibrium resulting in downstream outputs qi (c), mark-ups mi (c) and
profits πi(c) = qi(c) ·mi(c), i = 1, 2, such that qi (c) , mi (c) and thus πi(c)
are all non-increasing in ci and non-decreasing in cj, j 6= i.
Assumption 1 holds for many standard oligopoly models.
Next, we discuss how the ci’s in stage 3 are determined in the pre-
ceding stages. We assume that to produce one unit of the final product,
downstream firms require one unit of the intermediate product, which is
produced at constant marginal cost. An integrated firm produces the in-
put in-house, whereas a vertically separated firm buys the intermediate
product from the imperfectly competitive upstream market at the equi-
librium price.11 We let wi denote firm i’s marginal cost of obtaining the
intermediate product, which is the cost of producing the product in-house
for an integrated firm (Vi = 1), and the cost of obtaining it on the up-
stream market for a separated firm (Vi = 0). Transforming the intermedi-
ate product into the final good adds marginal transformation costs ti. Let
t ≡ max(t1, t2) and define firm i’s exogenous efficiency level as Yi ≡ t− ti.
We write wi (V,Y) for the upstream price as a function of the integration
decisions V = (V1, V2) and the exogenous efficiency levels Y = (Y1, Y2).
Firm i’s marginal costs are thus
ci (V,Y) = wi (V,Y) + t− Yi. (1)
In stage 1, acquisition costs are assumed to be given by a constant
F > 0. Thus, downstream firms choose Vi ∈ {0, 1} so as to maximize
πi (c1 (V,Y) , c2 (V,Y))− ViF.
Using Assumption 1, equilibrium product-market profits, mark-ups and
outputs are functions of the firms’ vertical structures and efficiency levels:
Notation 1 (equilibrium quantities) For i = 1, 2, denote downstream
profits, mark-ups and outputs, respectively, as
Πi (V,Y) = πi (c1 (V,Y) , c2 (V,Y)) ; (2)
Mi (V,Y) = mi(c1 (V,Y) , c2 (V,Y)); (3)
Qi (V,Y) = qi(c1 (V,Y) , c2 (V,Y)). (4)
11This equilibrium price is either set directly by a single upstream firm (if V = (1, 0)
or V = (0, 1)) or results from upstream competition in stage 2 (if V = (0, 0)) .
We require that these quantities satisfy the following condition:
Assumption 2 Product-market profits are exchangeable, i.e. for all V 0, V 00 ∈
{0, 1} and Y 0, Y 00 ∈ [0,∞) ,
Π1(V 0, V 00;Y 0, Y 00) = Π2(V 00, V 0, Y 00, Y 0).
Analogous properties hold for Qi and Mi.
This symmetry assumption requires that the firms’ profits depend only
on their actions and efficiency levels, but not on their identity.
The properties of Mi (V,Y) and Qi (V,Y) reflect all the information
from stages 2 and 3 that we require for our analysis. We shall therefore
state the remaining assumptions in terms of these functions. Below, we
shall show that well-known specific models satisfy our assumptions. We
require that integration (weakly) increases own output and mark-up.
Assumption 3 For i, j = 1, 2, equilibrium output Qi and mark-up Mi are
non-decreasing in Vi.
In the Appendix, we show how Assumption 3 can be derived from more
primitive assumptions. Intuitively, consider (3) and (4): Vi affects Qi and
Mi via ci and cj. The motivation for assuming a positive effect of Vi on Qi
(andMi) is that Vi reduces ci either by eliminating the mark-up from imper-
fect upstream competition or by exploiting purely technological economies
of scope–this is the efficiency effect of integration. The effect of Vi on
cj is less clear: At least if integrated firms are not active on the whole-
sale market, backward integration of a downstream firm means that supply
and demand on the wholesale market typically both fall. If the supply ef-
fect dominates, an increase in Vi increases the wholesale price and thus
cj, j 6= i–this is the foreclosure effect of integration, which reinforces As-
sumption 3, as higher competitor costs tend to increase own output and
mark-up by Assumption 1. If the demand effect dominates, cj falls. In this
case, Assumption 3 is less plausible as decreasing competitor costs decrease
own output and mark-up. The effects of efficiency levels on outputs and
mark-ups are captured as follows.
Assumption 4 For i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, equilibrium outputs Qi and mark-ups
Mi are (i) non-decreasing in Yi and (ii) non-increasing in Yj.
In the Appendix, we show how Assumption 4 can be derived from more
primitive assumptions. Intuitively, as to (i), higher own efficiency reduces
own costs by (1) if the direct effect of efficiency is not compensated by
a strong increase in the input price, i.e., if ∂wi/∂Yi < 1. Indirect effects
on competitor costs should reinforce this effect: Higher transformation effi-
ciency means that firm i demands more intermediate input, thereby tending
to increase the wholesale price for the competitor. As to (ii), if the com-
petitor j becomes more efficient, this should adversely affect Qi and Mi
by decreasing cj. In addition, higher Yj should also increase the wholesale
price by increasing input demand, thereby driving up ci for separated firms,
thus reinforcing the negative effect on Qi and Mi.12
3 A Simple Cournot Example
To provide a simple example where all four assumptions are satisfied si-
multaneously, we consider the following 2×2 firms model.13 Suppose down-
stream firms compete a` la Cournot, with linear demand given by P (Q) =
a − Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2 and a > 0. For simplicity, assume that the
marginal cost of producing the input good is constant and normalized to
zero. For an integrated firm, therefore, wi = 0. If both firms are integrated
(V = (1, 1)), the model corresponds to standard Cournot competition. If
both firms are separated (V = (0, 0)) , we suppose Cournot competition
upstream precedes downstream competition. If only one firm is separated
(V = (0, 1) or V = (1, 0)), the remaining upstream firm sets a linear
monopoly price for the separated downstream firm.14
Table 1 summarizes the results, with α ≡ a− t. Assumption 1 is a stan-
dard property of the linear Cournot model. Inspection of Table 1 further
shows that Assumptions 2, 3 and 4 hold for all admissible Y.15
Table 1: Outputs, mark-ups and profits in the linear Cournot example
V = (0, 0) V = (1, 0) V = (0, 1) V = (1, 1)
Q1 =M1 4α+11Y1−7Y218
5α+7Y1−2Y2
12
2α+4Y1−2Y2
12
4α+8Y1−4Y2
12
Q2 =M2 4α−7Y1+11Y218
2α−2Y1+4Y2
12
5α−2Y1+7Y2
12
4α−4Y1+8Y2
12
Π1
¡
4α+11Y1−7Y2
18
¢2 ¡5α+7Y1−2Y2
12
¢2 ¡2α+4Y1−2Y2
12
¢2 ¡4α+8Y1−4Y2
12
¢2
Π2
¡
4α−7Y1+11Y2
18
¢2 ¡2α−2Y1+4Y2
12
¢2 ¡5α−2Y1+7Y2
12
¢2 ¡4α−4Y1+8Y2
12
¢2
12If firm i is integrated, the second effect is absent, as an integrated firm does not rely
on the wholesale market.
13The model is adapted from Salinger (1988) who considers arbitrary numbers of
homogeneous firms.
14We assume in this example that integrated firms do not supply the intermediate good
on the wholesale market. Our general approach, however, also makes sense without this
restriction (see section 5.2).
15We assume that efficiency differences are small enough that each firm produces a
positive output.
4 Analyzing Integration Decisions
Next, we analyze integration decisions. We use the following notation:
Notation 2 (integration effects) For i = 1, 2, j 6= i, f = Π, Q,M, let
∆f1 (V2;Y) ≡ f1 (1, V2;Y)− f1 (0, V2;Y) ;
∆f2 (V1;Y) ≡ f2 (V1, 1;Y)− f2 (V1, 0;Y) .
Thus, ∆Πi (Vj;Y) is firm i’s integration incentive, i.e., the effect of its
integration on own profits. ∆Qi and ∆Mi denote the output and mark-up
effects of own integration. We shall use the following terminology:
Definition 1 (i) Vertical integration decisions are strategic substi-
tutes if ∆Πi (Vj;Y) is non-increasing in Vj for i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i.
(ii) Low-cost firms have higher integration incentives than high-cost
firms if, for H > L and eV ∈ {0, 1},
∆Π1(eV ;H,L) ≥ ∆Π2(eV ;H,L). (5)
4.1 Symmetric Firms
We first give conditions under which asymmetric equilibria emerge in a
symmetric setting (Y1 = Y2 = 0). These conditions hold in our example of
Section 3. We require the following result.
Lemma 1 (strategic substitutes) Suppose that, for Y = 0 and i, j =
1, 2, i 6= j, the following statements hold:
(i) Vertical integration has an adverse cross effect, i.e
Qi and Mi are non-increasing in Vj. (6)
(ii) Vertical integration does not raise the competitor’s output and mark-
up increase from vertical integration, i.e.
∆Qi (Vj;Y) and ∆Mi (Vj;Y) are non-increasing in Vj. (7)
Then vertical-integration decisions are strategic substitutes.
Proof. By exchangeability, it suffices to consider firm 1’s incentive to
integrate, ∆Π1 (V2;Y). Rewriting this profit differential yields
∆Π1 (V2;Y) = Q1 (1, V2;Y) ·∆M1 (V2;Y) (8)
+M1 (0, V2;Y) ·∆Q1 (V2;Y) .
By Assumption 3, both ∆M1 (V2;Y) and ∆Q1 (V2;Y) are non-negative.
By (6), Q1 andM1 are both non-increasing in V2. By (7), ∆M1 (V2;Y) and
∆Q1 (V2;Y) are non-increasing in V2. Thus (8) is non-increasing in V2.
The adverse cross effect condition (6) makes sense for two reasons. First,
if firm j’s integration reduces its marginal costs, firm j becomes a stronger
downstream competitor (cross-efficiency effect). Second, after integration,
the integrated upstream firm may have an incentive to curtail supply to the
input market, thereby raising the cost of a non-integrated rival (foreclosure
effect).16
The intuition for Lemma 1 is as follows: Vertical integration by firm i
(weakly) increases firm i’s demand and mark-up by Assumption 3, whereas
vertical integration by firm j decreases these quantities by (6). Now, as
firm j’s integration reduces the mark-up Mi, the positive effect of a given
output increase ∆Qi on firm i’s profits is smaller when firm j is integrated.
Similarly, the positive effect of a given mark-up increase ∆Mi on firm i’s
profits is smaller when firm j is integrated, because firm j’s integration
reduces firm i’s demand Qi. Thus, if ∆Qi and ∆Mi are independent of the
competitor’s vertical structure, integration decisions are strategic substi-
tutes. A fortiori, when the integration of firm j reduces ∆Qi and ∆Mi, as
required by (7), the strategic substitutes property holds.
Thus, demand/mark-up complementarities in the product market are
likely to make integration decisions strategic substitutes. However, condi-
tion (7) may be violated when firm j’s integration gives rise to a strong
foreclosure effect, as firm i will then have relatively high costs when it is
separated. Thus, firm i’s cost reduction from own integration is likely to be
higher when firm j is integrated. In this case, other things being equal, out-
put and mark-up increases ∆Qi and ∆Mi will be higher when firm j is inte-
grated. As a result, in spite of demand/mark-up complementarities in the
product market, the strategic substitutes property of vertical-integration
decisions may be violated when the foreclosure effect is strong.17
Using Lemma 1, we now characterize the equilibria of the game.
Proposition 1 (symmetric costs) Suppose Y = 0, and conditions (6)
and (7) hold. Then, for suitable values of F , there exist equilibria of the
integration game where exactly one firm integrates.
The proof is straightforward. Lemma 1 shows that integration decisions
are strategic substitutes. Therefore, for suitable values of F , we have
∆Πi (0;Y) ≥ F ≥ ∆Πi (1;Y) . (9)
16Whether vertical foreclosure emerges in equilibrium depends on subtle details of the
specific model under consideration: For instance, foreclosure will typically occur for low
numbers of upstream suppliers (Salinger 1988) or high costs of switching suppliers (Chen
2001).
17A similar effect occurs in Ordover et al. (1990): If the competitor’s integration raises
the upstream price excessively, the separated firm has an incentive to integrate.
Thus, if only one firm integrates, it is not profitable for either firm to
deviate.
There are two caveats to the conclusion of Proposition 1. First, recall
that the strategic substitutes condition may be violated if there is a strong
foreclosure effect. In the opposite polar case where integration decisions are
strategic complements rather than substitutes, vertical integration by firm
j renders vertical integration more profitable for firm i (i.e. ∆Πi (1;Y) >
∆Πi (0;Y)).18 As a result, only symmetric equilibria can exist. Second,
even if integration decisions are strategic substitutes, symmetric equilibria
will still arise when F is so high that the l.h.s. of (9) is violated: Then,
no firm will integrate. Similarly, when F is so low that the r.h.s. of (9) is
violated, all firms integrate.
4.2 Efficient Firms Are More Likely to Integrate
Next, we consider the notion that low-cost firms are more likely to integrate
than high-cost firms. A strong version of this statement would be that
Y1 > Y2 implies V1 ≥ V2 in any equilibrium of the integration game. Yet,
Proposition 1 suggests that such a result cannot hold: If Y1 = Y2 = 0,
there may well be an equilibrium with only firm 2 integrating, because
∆Πi (0,Y) ≥ ∆Πi (1;Y). If ∆Πi (0;Y) > ∆Πi (1;Y) for Y = 0 and
Πi (V;Y) is a continuous function of Y in a neighborhood of Y = 0, such
an equilibrium still exists when firm 2 is slightly less efficient than firm 1.
However, efficient firms may be more likely to integrate in the sense
that the following two statements hold.
(i) If there is an equilibrium where only the inefficient firm integrates,
there is also an equilibrium where only the efficient firm does.
(ii) If there is an equilibrium where only the efficient firm integrates, there
is not necessarily an equilibrium where only the inefficient firm does.
To support these claims, we first give conditions guaranteeing that low-
cost firms face higher integration incentives than high-cost firms.
Lemma 2 (efficiency/integration complementarity) Suppose that, with
H > L, the following conditions hold:19
∆Q1(V2;H,L) ≥ ∆Q1(V2;L,H); (10)
∆M1(V2;H,L) ≥ ∆M1(V2;L,H). (11)
Then (5) holds, i.e., low-cost firms have higher integration incentives than
high-cost firms.
18Obviously, intermediate cases can arise where integration decisions are neither glob-
ally substitutes nor complements. In such cases, asymmetric equilibria are still possible.
19By exchangeability, analogous conditions must then hold for ∆Q2 and ∆M2.
Proof. See Appendix.
To grasp the intuition of Lemma 2, note that by exchangeability, we
have ∆Π2(eV ;H,L) = ∆Π1(eV ;L,H), and we can thus write (5) as
∆Π1(eV ;H,L) ≥ ∆Π1(eV ;L,H). (12)
By Assumption 3, firm 1’s integration incentive comes from the increase
in output ∆Q1 and mark-up ∆M1. A relatively efficient firm 1 with high
state H has higher output and mark-up than a relatively inefficient firm
with state L < H. Thus, for the relatively efficient firm 1, the value of a
given output increase ∆Q from integration is higher than for the inefficient
firm 2, as the output increase applies to a greater mark-up. Similarly,
the value of a given mark-up increase ∆M is higher for the efficient firm,
as its output is higher. Therefore, demand/mark-up complementarities
support condition (12). A countervailing force could arise if the sizes of the
output and mark-up increases were higher for relatively inefficient firms.
Conditions (10) and (11) prevent this.20 We now use Lemma 2 to show
that conditions (10) and (11) together imply statements (i) and (ii).21
Proposition 2 (asymmetric costs) Suppose conditions (10) and (11)
hold. Further assume that firm 1 is more efficient than firm 2, i.e. Y1 > Y2.
(i) If there is a pure strategy equilibrium (V ∗1 , V
∗
2 ) with V
∗
1 < V
∗
2 , there
also is a pure strategy equilibrium with V ∗1 > V
∗
2 .
(ii) If there is a pure strategy equilibrium (V ∗1 , V
∗
2 ) with V
∗
1 > V
∗
2 , there
is not necessarily a pure strategy equilibrium with V ∗1 < V
∗
2 .
Proof. (i) An equilibrium of the integration game where only the inef-
ficient firm integrates requires that, for H > L,
∆Π2 (0;H,L) ≥ F ≥ ∆Π1 (1;H,L) . (13)
The equilibrium where only the efficient firm integrates requires
∆Π1 (0;H,L) ≥ F ≥ ∆Π2 (1;H,L) . (14)
If (5) holds, (13) implies (14). Thus, Lemma 1 implies the result.
(ii) To find a counterexample, suppose (10) and (11) hold with in-
equality, and output and mark-up are strictly increasing in Vi. Then, (5)
20Conditions (10) and (11) hold in the Cournot example of Section 3.
21Note that our result does not assume that integration decisions are strategic sub-
stitutes. With this assumption, the game would be supermodular after reordering the
strategy space of one of the players, and we could apply standard methods of monotone
comparative statics (Milgrom and Roberts 1990, Th. 5) to obtain the conclusion of
Proposition 2.
also holds with inequality. If (6) and (7) also hold with inequality, then
∆Πi (Vj;Y) is decreasing in Vj. If Πi(V,Y) is continuous in Y near zero,
then for H > L, but sufficiently close to L, Lemmas 1 and 2 imply:
∆Π2 (1;H,L) < ∆Π1 (1;H,L) < ∆Π2 (0;H,L) < ∆Π1 (0;H,L) .
Thus, for suitable levels of F , (14) holds, but (13) does not.
Proposition 2 states that efficient firms are more likely to integrate.
However, it does not rule out the possibility that only symmetric equilibria
exist.
4.3 Applications and Limitations
We now discuss in which kind of industries the assumptions underlying
Propositions 1 and 2 are plausible.
4.3.1 Example 1: Pure Efficiency Effects
Both propositions apply to a setting with efficiency effects, but without fore-
closure effects. These conditions are likely to hold when (i) upstream com-
petition is imperfect, (ii) there are economies of scope between upstream
and downstream operations, and (iii) final products are weak substitutes.22
When there are efficiency effects, but no interactions between integration
decisions and competitor costs, Assumption 3 is naturally satisfied.23 Also,
when there are only efficiency effects, the caveat that integration decisions
will not be strategic substitutes when there is a strong foreclosure effect
(i.e., condition (7) is violated) is no longer valid. Therefore, Propositions
1 and 2 appear particularly plausible when vertical integration generates
efficiency effects only.
4.3.2 Example 2: Efficiency and Foreclosure Effects
We now modify condition (iii) from Example 1 by assuming that final
products are close substitutes, so that foreclosure may be an issue. As
argued earlier, if foreclosure effects are strong, the strategic substitutes
property of vertical-integration decisions might be violated, so that equi-
libria with asymmetric vertical structures might not arise in a setting where
22For instance, in the U.S. motion picture entertainment industry a few large inte-
grated majors compete against smaller independent distributors (Litman 2001). Com-
petition is imperfect both at the production and the distribution stage, and there are
important integration efficiencies, including the ability to produce and distribute motion
pictures using all types of media. Furthermore, there is substantial product differentia-
tion.
23In particular, condition (16) of Lemma 3 in the Appendix, which is crucial for
deriving Assumption 3, holds.
firms are symmetric initially. Yet, we have also emphasized that the effi-
ciency/integration complementarity does not rely on strategic substitutes.
Thus, Proposition 2, which states that large efficient firms are more likely
to integrate, is still likely to hold in such a setting.
For instance, the vertical integration of gasoline refiners and retailers
in the U.S. has been suspected to generate sizeable foreclosure effects. In
this industry, which is dominated by a number of large integrated firms,
competition is clearly imperfect both at the refining and retailing stage,
there are considerable integration efficiencies (see Vita 2000), and final
products are close substitutes. Another well-documented example that
is consistent with the set-up described here and with the prediction of
Proposition 2 is the above-mentioned market for foreign package holidays
in the U.K. (see European Commission 1999a).
4.3.3 Example 3: Low Integration Incentives for Efficient Firms
There are at least two types of industries where the assumptions underlying
Proposition 2 may be violated, so that it is more likely to see large low-cost
separated firms and small high-cost integrated firms.
First, suppose large separated downstream firms obtain the interme-
diate product at more favorable terms than their smaller counterparts,
i.e., large buyers pay lower prices. This may occur, for instance, because
suppliers compete for large buyers (Snyder 1996, 1998), or large buyers
have higher bargaining power (Scherer and Ross 1990). In the food retail
distribution sector of several European countries, buyer power plays an im-
portant role (European Commission 1999b). The integration patterns in
this sector should thus not necessarily be expected to correspond to the
predictions of Proposition 2.
Second, consider industries where vertical integration serves as a quality-
enhancing device. For instance, in the hotel industry small establishments
sometimes adopt a “boutique strategy” and produce all vertically-related
services (e.g. construction, marketing, food processing) in-house to become
a premium hotel, whereas larger chains buy many of these services from
contractors. Such industries differ from our setting in that integration has a
quality effect and almost certainly increases rather than decreases marginal
costs. Nevertheless, such industries can be understood in terms of our as-
sumptions. It seems unreasonable to expect Assumption 3 to hold: While
the quality premium from integration suggests a high mark-up, output is
typically lower for an integrated “boutique firm”. Therefore, we cannot
appeal to the strategic substitutes property or the efficiency/integration-
complementarity to justify our results. Consequently, the predictions of our
analysis are likely to be inadequate for industries where boutique strategies
are in play.
5 Generalizations
We now discuss the plausibility of our results without the restrictions that
(i) there are two downstream firms, (ii) integrated firms do not engage in
wholesale activity and (iii) acquisition costs are constant.
5.1 Large Numbers of Downstream Firms
We sketch without proofs how our analysis generalizes to I > 2 downstream
firms. We replace the requirement “i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i” in Assumptions 1,
3 and 4 and in Lemma 1 by “i, j = 1, ..., I, j 6= i” and generalize As-
sumption 2 (exchangeability) to I > 2 firms as in Athey and Schmutzler
(2001). Further, for f =M,Q,Π, we generalize the notation ∆fi (Vj;Y) to
∆fi (V−i;Y) in an obvious way. We replace ∆fi (Vj;Y) with ∆fi (V−i;Y)
in (7), (10) and (11). We call the modified conditions (6)0,(7)0, (10)0 and
(11)0. Propositions 1 and 2 can then be restated as follows:
Proposition 3 (symmetric costs) For I ≥ 2 firms, suppose (6)0 and
(7)0 hold. Then, for suitable values of F and arbitrary k ∈ {1, ..., I − 1},
there exist equilibria of the integration game with Y = 0 where exactly k
firms integrate.
Proposition 4 (asymmetric costs) Suppose (10)0 and (11)0 hold. Sup-
pose for some k, l ∈ {1, ..., I} , Yk > Yl .
(i) If there is a pure strategy equilibrium V∗ with V ∗k < V
∗
l , there also is
a pure strategy equilibrium with V ∗k > V
∗
l .
(ii) If there is a pure strategy equilibrium V∗ with V ∗k > V
∗
l , there is not
necessarily a pure strategy equilibrium with V ∗k < V
∗
l .
5.2 Upstream Sales
We return to the case of two downstream firms. To model the possibility
of upstream sales, we continue to work with the reduced-form profit func-
tion Πi (V,Y). However, we now suppose that Πi may also contain profits
from upstream sales, ΠUi (V,Y).
24 Similarly, QUi (V,Y) and M
U
i (V,Y)
denote equilibrium upstream outputs and mark-ups, whereas QDi (V,Y)
and MDi (V,Y) are the corresponding downstream quantities. The objec-
tive function of firm i is thus
Πi (V,Y) = QDi (V,Y) ·MDi (V,Y) +QUi (V,Y) ·MUi (V,Y) .
The following properties are plausible:
24Whether it is reasonable for integrated firms to supply competitors depends on the
conjectures of integrated firms about the competitor’s behavior in the upstream market
(see, e.g., Salinger 1988, and Schrader and Martin 1998).
(i) QUi and Π
U
i are non-decreasing in Vi.
25
(ii) QUi ,M
U
i and thus Π
U
i are non-increasing in Yi.
Property (i) must hold because separated downstream firms do not
sell anything on the upstream market by definition, whereas integrated
firms sell non-negative quantities. Thus, the potential gains from upstream
sales are another motivation for vertical integration. As to property (ii),
note that if an integrated firm reduces its costs, its downstream output
increases, whereas its competitor’s output decreases. Thus, the competitor
will require less inputs on the wholesale market, which decreases firm j’s
wholesale demand. As a result, both QUi and M
U
i should decrease if Yi
increases. Thus, the prospect to sell upstream goods on the wholesale
market is less attractive for relatively efficient firms, which reduces the
incentive for efficient firms to integrate.
Now consider the cross effects of changes in Vj on QUi and M
U
i . To
avoid double marginalization, the downstream unit of firm j will demand
less inputs from firm i after integration. Therefore, we should expect a
negative effect of competitor integration on own upstream sales, which
reinforces the strategic substitutes property.26
5.3 Endogenous Acquisition Costs
Now suppose that for downstream firm i, the cost of acquiring an inde-
pendent upstream firm is given by a function A(Vj,Y) rather than by a
constant. That is, acquisition costs depend both on vertical structure and
efficiency levels. Assuming that acquisition costs reflect the opportunity
costs of the firms that are being taken over, it is likely that A is non-
decreasing in Yi and Yj. Intuitively, equilibrium output is higher when
downstream firms are more efficient. Thus, input demand and the prof-
its of upstream firms should be higher. Since acquisition costs reflect the
opportunity costs of takeover targets, they should approximately amount
to the profits of that firm in the absence of a merger. Thus, acquisition
costs should be expected to increase in downstream efficiency, at least if
the downstream competitor is integrated.
The effect of a change in Vj on A is again ambiguous. Intuitively, firm
j’s vertical integration will have a negative effect on both demand and
supply for the remaining separated upstream firm. If the demand effect
dominates, outputs, mark-ups and thus profits of the upstream firm to be
integrated by downstream firm i should fall. Acquisition costs should there-
fore decrease with Vj. Conversely, if the supply effect dominates, the profit
25For separated firms, the upstream mark-up MUi is not well-defined, as Q
U
i = 0.
26However, with more than two downstream firms, there might be a competing effect:
If integration leads competitor j to reduce its sales to the wholesale market, this should
have positive effects on the upstream sales of the integrated firm i.
of the upstream firm and thus acquisition costs should increase with Vj. As
a result, there may be circumstances where the conclusion of Proposition 1
does not hold when acquisition costs are endogenous: If the demand effect
dominates, firm i’s acquisition becomes less expensive, and Vi and Vj are
less likely to be strategic substitutes.
6 Related Literature
In this section, we relate our paper to existing literature. First, we dis-
cuss how the four key ingredients of our analysis have been addressed else-
where.27 Second, we sketch the main results on the endogenous emergence
of asymmetric vertical integration.
6.1 The Key Ingredients
(1) Efficiency and Foreclosure Effects. Salinger (1988) considers a
fixed-proportion linear Cournot model with arbitrary numbers of homoge-
neous firms, where integration always causes an efficiency effect as it elimi-
nates successive mark-ups. Whether integration also generates a foreclosure
effect depends on parameter values. More specifically, vertical integration–
which amounts to an exogenous change in the number of integrated firms–
increases the wholesale price if more than half of the firms producing the
intermediate product are vertically integrated.28
Ordover et al. (1990) examine a fixed-proportion model with endogenous
integration decisions. Two upstream firms produce a homogenous input
good and compete in prices. Two downstream firms produce differentiated
products and compete in prices. Their model thus rules out an efficiency
effect unless there is only one upstream firm, but gives rise to a foreclosure
effect in equilibrium.
Hart and Tirole (1990) analyze different variants29 of a model where two
upstream firms produce a homogenous input good and compete in prices,
whereas two downstream firms engage in Cournot competition. Non-linear
contracts between upstream and downstream firms are allowed. In the so-
called “ex post monopolization” variant of the model, the more efficient
upstream firm integrates with one of the downstream firms and slightly
undercuts the less efficient upstream firm to supply the other downstream
27We note in passing that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied in most models in the lit-
erature for wide parameter values; however, in Ordover et al. (1990), multiple equilibria
may arise for some specifications of demand.
28Gaudet and van Long (1996) obtain a similar result even when integrated firms
purchase from the upstream market to increase rivals costs, and integration decisions
are endogenous.
29These variants differ with respect to the bargaining power pertaining to upstream
and downstream firms.
firm. This results in an efficiency effect of integration.30 Integration has no
foreclosure effect, as it does not raise the downstream rival’s costs.
Chen (2001) considers a fixed-proportion model where two or more up-
stream firms produce a homogenous input good and may have different
marginal costs.31 Two downstream firms produce differentiated final prod-
ucts and compete in prices. Vertical integration always generates an effi-
ciency effect. There may also be a foreclosure effect, though the intuition
differs from previous literature: Integration changes a downstream firm’s
pricing incentive, as it becomes a supplier to its rival. This multimarket
interaction softens competition in the downstream market and changes the
rival’s incentive in selecting input suppliers.
Summing up, previous literature suggests that vertical integration helps
gaining competitive advantage by cutting own costs or by raising rivals’
costs.
(2) Positive Own Effects and Negative Cross Effects. As we
noted, the efficiency and foreclosure effects of vertical integration motivate
our analysis. Yet, what we really need is less restrictive: Integration should
have positive own effects (Assumption 3) and adverse cross effects (Con-
dition (6)). This does not necessarily require both efficiency effects and
foreclosure effects to be present. For instance, in Salinger (1988), both
Assumption 3 and Condition (6) are satisfied universally, even though fore-
closure will only arise for a subset of parameter values.
(3) Integration Incentives. The key intuition of our paper is that the
combined positive own effect and adverse cross effect of integration tend
to imply that (a) vertical-integration decisions are strategic substitutes,
and (b) efficient firms face higher integration incentives. The driving force
are demand/mark-up complementarities in the product market. While this
observation is new in the context of vertical-integration decisions, similar
mechanisms have been exploited in other fields. For instance, Bagwell
and Staiger (1994) and Athey and Schmutzler (2001) use the related idea
that cost-reducing investments are strategic substitutes in the context of
many oligopoly models. Complementarities between demand-enhancing
and mark-up-increasing activities are crucial for this result.32
(4) Characterizing Equilibria. Finally, we analyzed the implications
30With non-linear upstream prices and homogeneous suppliers, integration may have
no effect whatsoever on downstream marginal costs (Rey and Tirole, forthcoming). Yet,
even in this case, there is the standard textbook argument (e.g. Besanko et al. 2000,
173) that post-integration costs might be lower because of economies of scope between
upstream and downstream production.
31To our knowledge, Linnemer (2003) is the only related paper allowing for asymmetric
cost structures at the downstream level.
32Demand/mark-up complementarities also drive the complementarity between prod-
uct and process innovations highlighted by Athey and Schmutzler (1995); Aydemir and
Schmutzler (forthcoming) analyze the role of demand/mark-up complementarities in the
context of horizontal acquisitions.
of properties (a) and (b) for the equilibria of the integration game. In
Proposition 2, we have examined how the complementarity between cost
efficiency and vertical integration affects equilibriummarket structure. Pro-
position 2 bears some similarity to Theorem 1 in Athey and Schmutzler
(2001), which considers the relation between a state variable (which could,
for instance, be interpreted as the efficiency level of a firm) and an invest-
ment variable (which could, for instance, be interpreted as the integration
decision) in games with strategic substitutes. However, note that we do
not use the strategic substitutes property in the derivation of Proposition
2.33
6.2 Endogenous Asymmetric Equilibria
Earlier literature has dealt with the conditions supporting asymmetric in-
tegration equilibria. Both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria have been
observed in Cournot as well as Bertrand models.
Employing a linear Cournot model, Gaudet and van Long (1996) show
that, depending on the number of firms in the upstream and downstream
market, asymmetric equilibria may arise where some but not all firms inte-
grate, even if firms are perfectly symmetric in all other aspects. Abiru et al.
(1998) confirm that, for unequal numbers of Cournot oligopolists at each
stage, asymmetric integration is possible for certain parameter values. Em-
ploying yet another variant of the linear Cournot model, Elberfeld (2002)
also obtains asymmetric integration equilibria in a symmetric setting, and
he derives the conditions under which there is a negative relation between
market size and the extent of vertical integration. Jansen (2003) provides
conditions under which some (otherwise symmetric) upstream firms choose
vertical integration, whereas others choose vertical separation, using a vari-
ant of a model proposed by Gal-Or (1990), where downstream demand is
linear and firms compete a` la Cournot.
Ordover et al. (1990) study a 2×2 firms model with price competition
and differentiated downstream goods. They show that asymmetric vertical
integration does emerge in equilibrium, provided the downstream firms’
revenues are increasing in the input price (and the latter does not increase
too much). However, these authors also show that if downstream firms
compete in quantities, the only equilibrium entails no vertical integration.
33More generally, although we do not explicitly refer to particular results from the
monotone comparative statics literature (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts 1990), the techniques
used to prove the result are similar.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides two main results on successive oligopolies. First, even
in a symmetric setting it is possible that some firms integrate vertically,
and others do not. Second, when downstream firms differ with respect to
their initial efficiency levels, efficient firms are more likely to integrate.
The first result cautions against the notion that bandwagoning prevents
asymmetric vertical integration. The second result is consistent with the
observation that, in many vertically-related industries, the large firms tend
to be the integrated ones: Efficiency works towards a high market share,
and, as our analysis shows, it also works towards vertical integration.
Both results are generated by demand/mark-up complementarities in
the product market, which are present in many models of successive oligo-
polies. However, as we have pointed out, there are countervailing forces
that may, in principle, upset these findings. For instance, the strategic
substitutes property, which is necessary for asymmetric equilibria to emerge
in a symmetric setting, may be violated when strong foreclosure effects are
present. It might also fail to hold if the integration of a competitor drives
down acquisition costs, thus making further integration more attractive.
Further, there are reasons why more efficient firms are not necessarily more
likely to integrate: For instance, because their competitors have relatively
low demand, they do not expect to sell much on the upstream market.
We conjecture that our approach can be generalized further. For in-
stance, while we defined our cost function ci (V,Y) using a one-to-one
technology, our main results can be derived for non-linear technologies as
long as the relevant quantities Mi (V;Y), Qi (V;Y), etc. are well-defined
and Assumptions 2-4 and the supplementary conditions used in the propo-
sitions hold.
8 Appendix
8.1 Justifying Monotonicity Assumptions
In this section, we show how our Assumptions 3 and 4 as well as Condition
(6) can be derived from more primitive conditions.
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Further assume that, for i, j =
1, 2, j 6= i,
ci (V;Y) is non-increasing in Vi, (15)
ci (V;Y) is non-decreasing in Vj. (16)
Then Assumption 3 and Condition (6) hold.
Proof. By (15), integration weakly reduces own costs. By (16), it
weakly reduces competitor costs. Thus, Qi andMi are non-decreasing in Vi
by Assumption 1, and Assumption 3 follows. Similarly, firm j’s integration
weakly reduces its costs and increases firm i’s costs; by Assumption 1, it
therefore weakly decreases firm i’s output and mark-up.
The result is still true when the effect of Vj on ci is negative, but
sufficiently small. The statement about condition (6) requires the addi-
tional condition that ci (V;Y) is decreasing in Vi rather than merely non-
increasing. Next, we provide a similar result for the effects of changes in
efficiency.
Lemma 4 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Further assume that, for
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i,
ci (V;Y) is non-increasing in Yi, (17)
ci (V;Y) is non-decreasing in Yj. (18)
Then, for i = 1, 2, j 6= i, Assumption 4 holds.
Proof. From Qi (V,Y) = qi (c1 (V,Y) , c2 (V,Y)) ,
∂Qi
∂Yi
=
∂qi
∂ci
∂ci
∂Yi
+
∂qi
∂cj
∂cj
∂Yi
.
Using (17) and Assumption 1, ∂Qi/∂Yi > 0 if (18) holds.
The argument for Mi and for the effects of Yj is similar.
The conclusion of Lemma 4 still holds when ci (V;Y) is decreasing in
Yj, as long as this effect is small relative to the efficiency effects.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Using exchangeability, (6) holds if, for V2 = 0 and V2 = 1,
Π1 (1, V2;L,H)−Π1 (0, V2;L,H) ≤
Π1 (1, V2;H,L)−Π1 (0, V2;H,L) .
This condition would clearly hold if
Q1 (1, V2;L,H) ·∆M1(V2;L,H) +M1(0, V2;L,H) ·∆Q1(V2;L,H) ≤
Q1 (1, V2;H,L) ·∆M1(V2;L,H) +M1(0, V2;H,L) ·∆Q1(V2;L,H) ≤
Q1 (1, V2;H,L) ·∆M1(V2;H,L) +M1(0, V2;H,L) ·∆Q1(V2;H,L).
For the first inequality, note that, by Assumption 3, ∆M1(V2;L,H) ≥ 0
and ∆Q1(V2;L,H) ≥ 0; by Assumption 4,
M1(0, V2;L,H) ≤M1(0, V2;H,L) and Q1(1, V2;L,H) ≤ Q1(1, V2;H,L).
The second inequality follows from (10) and (11).
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